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ZONING ESTOPPEL: APPLICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND
VESTED RIGHTS TO ZONING DISPUTES
DAVID G. HEETER*
Property owners in zoning controversies with local governments
often attempt to establish that the government estopped itself by some
prior act. Typically, the local government issues a building permit to
the owner, and he begins construction. Before he completes con-
struction, however, the government adopts an amendment to the zon-
ing ordinance changing the applicable requirements and in turn
revoking his permit. The owner argues that the government estopped
itself by issuance of the building permit because the permit apparently
granted the right to complete construction, he relied upon this, and
he would be injured if the government were allowed to enforce the
new zoning.
Despite the historical rule that a government cannot be estopped
while acting in a governmental capacity,' as a local government does
* Editor, Land Use Control Service, American Society of Planning Officials;
B.F.A., Washington University, 1962; J.D., Washington University, 1967; LL.M.,
Washington University, 1968.
1. This rule has been characterized as "a prerogative fallacy" because it is
nothing more than a general statement subject to numerous exceptions. Berger,
Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. Cni. L. REv. 680, 683 (1954). This
characterization generally reflects the status of the rule with respect to zoning
cases, Many of the courts still hold that the principle of estoppel should be applied
sparingly against local governments exercising their zoning powers. However,
they will generally find some way to give relief if the owner would otherwise
suffer a hardship. Compare Mazo v. City of Detroit, 9 Mich. App. 354, 156
N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1968) with Township of Pittsfield v. Malcom, 375 Mich.
135, 134 N.W.2d 166 (1965). In Mazo, the court denied relief to a landowner
who had relied on a permit that violated the spacing requirements for taverns
and who would have suffered a loss of $6,500, on the ground that non-estoppel
of municipalities in the enforcement of zoning ordinances is the rule in Michigan.
At the same time, it acknowledged that it had granted relief in Township of
Pittsfield, where an owner had built a dog kennel costing $45,000 in reliance upon
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while exercising its zoning powers, it appears that a majority of the
courts now hold that the defense of equitable estoppel may be raised
against local governments in this and certain other kinds of zoning
disputes. Some of the same courts, and apparently all of those which
continue to hold that a government cannot be estopped in a zoning
controversy, recognize a legal defense cast in terms of whether the
property owner acquired "vested rights" to use his land without gov-
ernmental interference. The origins of the two defenses are quite
different. The defense of estoppel is derived from equity,2 but the de-
an erroneously issued permit, because the case presented such "exceptional cir-
cumstances." On the other hand, some courts seem as willing to apply the
principle of estoppel against local governments as against private individuals. See
note 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the approach taken by the
Illinois courts resulting in the frequent application of the principle of estoppel.
Nevertheless, there are certain kinds of zoning cases in which a majority of the
courts still refuse to grant relief to property owners.
For other material dealing with the application of the principle of estoppel to
zoning cases see, HAGAIAN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICa §§ 5.48-61 (1969); 9
E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 26.213-14 (3d ed. 1964); 1
METZENBAUM, ZONING 162-77 (2d ed. 1955); Note, The Building Permit and
Reliance Thereon in South Carolina, 21 S.C.L.Q. 70 (1968); Comment, The
Effect of Pending Legislation on Application for Building Permits in California,
3 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. Rnv. 124 (1968).
2. The following often cited statements by Pomeroy will be used to demonstrate
the differences between zoning estoppel and equitable estoppel. He defines
equitable estoppel as:
the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely pre-
cluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps
have otherwise existed, either of property, of conduct, or of remedy, as
against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct,
and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on
his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract
or of remedy. 2 POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804
(4th ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited as POIEROY].
In addition, Pomeroy identifies six elements which must generally be present
before a party will be estopped. The elements are:
(1) There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a
representation or concealment of material facts. (2) These facts must be
known to the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the
circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed
to him. (3) The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct
was done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him. (4) The conduct
must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will
be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both
natural and probable that it will be so acted upon. There are several familiar
species in which it is simply impossible to ascribe any intention or even ex-
pectation to the party estopped that his conduct will be acted upon by the
one who afterwards claims the benefit of the estoppel. (5) The conduct must
be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act
upon it. (6) He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his
position for the worse; in other words, he must so act that he would suffer a
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fense of vested rights reflects principles of common and constitutional
lawA Similarly, their elements are different. Estoppel focuses upon
whether it would be inequitable to allow the government to repudiate
its prior conduct; vested rights upon whether the owner acquired
real property rights which cannot be taken away by governmental
regulation. Nevertheless, the courts seem to reach the same results
when applying these defenses to identical factual situations.
At first glance, the decisions setting forth the circumstances under
which the defenses of either estoppel or vested rights will be allowed
appear confused and conflicting. The difficulty in attempting to make
sense out of these decisions lies in two facts. First, they are generally
written in the traditional language of the principles of estoppel and
vested rights, and second, they are understandable only when ana-
lyzed in light of a principle of law-characterized here as zoning
estoppel-which is hardly ever fully articulated. This could be an-
other example, in a field already too full of such examples, of the
courts' either not understanding what they are saying or saying some-
thing other than what they mean.4 It also could be an example of
the courts', consciously or unconsciously, attempting to adapt the
historical principles of estoppel and vested rights to the exigencies of
loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done
by reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to
assert rights inconsistent with it. Id. at 1644-45.
Pomeroy then goes on to note numerous qualifications and exceptions to the
six elements. As will be discussed, these exceptions are often more relevant to the
cases in which zoning estoppel was applied than are his six general elements.
3. The principle of vested rights is less precise and is based upon concepts of
common and constitutional law.
When it is said that the legislature ought not to deprive parties of their
"vested rights" all that is meant is this: that the rights styled "vested" are
sacred and inviolable, or are such as the parties ought not to be deprived of
by the legislature. Like a thousand other propositions which sound speciously
to the ear, it is either purely identical and tells us nothing, or begs the ques-
tion in issue. This use of "vested" has passed from the domain of politics to
that of law, by reason of the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, and in most of the State Constitutions, that
no one shall be deprived of his property "without due process of law," or
"but by the law of the land." GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITMS 98
& n. 1 (3d ed. 1915).
4. The warning given in Kiker v. City of Riverdale, 223 Ga. 142, 143, 154
S.E.2d 17, 18 (1967) is apt: "Estoppel arises under a variety of circumstances
and generally the cases rather than any rule must be reviewed and applied."
Another author has expressed similar feelings about the way in which the courts
dispose of substantive issues in zoning cases which purport to determine whether
property owners have standing. Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in Land
Use Disputes: Some Notes from a Dark Continent, 55 IowA L. REV. 344 (1969).
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contemporary zoning litigation. In any event, the so-called principle
of zoning estoppel appears to provide a generally reliable means of
analyzing and explaining those decisions in which either equitable
estoppel or vested rights were raised as a defense.
I. THE PRINCIPrLE OF ZONING ESTOPPEL
A synthesis of the cases in which either equitable estoppel or vested
rights were asserted and allowed as a defense5 reveals the following
principle of zoning estoppel:
A local government exercising its zoning powers will be
estopped when a property owner,
(1) relying in good faith,
(2) upon some act or omission of the government,
(3) has made such a substantial change in position or
incurred such extensive obligations and expenses
that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the
rights which he ostensibly had acquired.
This black letter statement of the principle of zoning estoppel is
the core of this article. The remaining sections will be devoted to
the four factual categories of cases in which zoning estoppel is most
often invoked and allowed as a defense; the meaning of each of the
three elements of zoning estoppel relative to each of the four factual
categories; and, an evaluation of whether the interests of property
owners and the public are adequately protected by the principle, as
well as some recommendations for change.
5. The relationship between the principles of equitable estoppel and vested
rights in the zoning cases is indeed curious. Apparently those courts unwilling to
hold that a government can be estopped while exercising its governmental powers
apply the principle of vested rights to avoid the hardships their position on
estoppel could promote. The danger inherent in this stance is apparent: if the
landowner's attorney chooses the wrong argument, i.e., estoppel, his client will be
denied relief.
The courts also confuse the two principles and use the terminology of both
interchangeably. Thus it is not unusual to find a court holding the city "estopped"
because the property owner acquired "vested rights." See, e.g., District of Co-
lumbia v. Cahill, 54 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1931). In addition, there are cases in
which the courts have held that a local government cannot be estopped, but
which, nevertheless, held that the government could not enforce the zoning
ordinance on the basis of other unidentified equitable principles. See, e.g., Town
of Marblehead v. Decry, - Mass. -, 254 N.B.2d 234 (1969). Similarly, in
State ex rel. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304
(1964), the court held that an oil company had never acquired any vested rights
-its application having been rejected three times--but, nevertheless, granted




II. Tr FOUR CATEGORIES OF CASES
The cases in which zoning estoppel is most often invoked and al-
lowed as a defense fall into four factual categories. They involve
reliance upon (1) a validly issued permit; (2) the probability of
issuance of a permit; (3) an erroneously issued permit; or (4) the
non-enforcement of a zoning violation. Under the laws of zoning
and building permits which normally govern these cases, a property
owner would have no right to relief if, for example, he relied upon a
validly issued permit which was subsequently revoked, regardless of
the extent to which he incurred expenses and obligations in reliance
upon it. To avoid the harsh results to which the rules governing
these cases could lead, the courts increasingly allow zoning estoppel to
be asserted as a defense.
A. Category One: Reliance upon a Validly Issued Permit
This category of cases occurs most frequently. In most of the cases
in category one, the property owner initiated development relying on
a permit validly issued by the local government. Before he had com-
pleted his development, however, the local government amended the
zoning ordinance to prohibit his intended use or structure. This
terminated his permit. Also falling into category one are a number
of cases in which the owner began the development of a use or struc-
ture in the absence of any applicable zoning ordinance. Here, too,
the local government prohibited the use or structure before the
owner had realized his intentions.
There are numerous decisions sustaining the power of the local
government to prohibit the owner from proceeding in these situations.
The general rule is that building permits are not protected, per se,
against revocation by subsequent legislation, because a permit issued
under the police power confers no rights upon the permittee. 6 Thus,
if one begins construction relying on a permit, only to have the zon-
ing changed and his permit revoked before construction is completed,
the new zoning will control, not the zoning in effect when the permit
was issued.7 Similarly, a development begun in the absence of any
6. 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at § 25.156.
7. See, e.g., Geneva Investment Co. v. City of St. Louis, 87 F.2d 83 (8th Cir.
1937); Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965);
Cline v. City of Boulder, - Colo. -, 450 P.2d 335 (1969); North Redington
Beach v. Williams, 220 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People ex rel.
Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 56 Ill. App. 2d 436, 206 N.E.2d 441 (1965);
Brett v. Building Comm'r, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924); Pearce v. Lorson,
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zoning must conform to a subsequently adopted zoning ordinance if
it is not completed as of the date of the ordinance.8
However, in most of the decisions denying relief in category one,
the owner did not incur such extensive expenses or obligations that
he would have suffered an indisputable hardship if the new zoning
were enforced.9 In other cases, the owner did not act in good faith?10
In short, the owners in these cases did not make an appropriate case
for the application of the principle of zoning estoppel. Thus, it is
doubtful if these cases hold that a landowner can never secure relief
in a category one situation. Instead, the law seems to be that all of
393 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); County of Sanders v. Moore, 182 Neb.
377, 155 N.W.2d 317 (1967); Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523, 226
A.2d 99 (1967); Winn v. Lamoy Realty Corp., 100 N.H. 280, 124 A.2d 211
(1956); Town of Lloyd v. Kart Wheelers Raceway, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 1015,
283 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1967); Warner v. W & 0, Inc., 263 N.C. 37, 138 S.E.2d
782 (1964); Howe Realty Co. v. City of Nashville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S.W.2d
904 (1940).
8. See, e.g., Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965);
City of Syracuse v. Farmers Elevator, Inc., 182 Neb. 783, 157 N.W.2d 394
(1968); Cahn v. Guion, 27 Ohio App. 141, 160 N.E. 868 (1927); City of
Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 93 A.2d 447 (1953).
9. The extent of the owner's reliance in the cases cited in notes 7 and 8 supra
was as follows: Geneva Investment Co., note 7 (had not done any substantial
work); Town of Lebanon, note 8 (although the developer had completed 14
homes which were allowed to remain, the court found that the entire subdivision
tract was not irrevocably committed so as to constitute a nonconforming use);
Cline, note 7 (service station was still in the "dream state"); North Redington
Beach, note 7 (had not acted on permit for a year and a half); People ex rel.
Nat'l Bank, note 7 (merely some $1,600 or so paid in wages to regular employees
who would have been paid anyway to do some work on designing apartments);
Brett, note 7 (did some excavation and entered into construction contracts);
Pearce, note 7 (one hour before the ordinance was adopted, a chiropodist hung a
sign in the window, installed a treatment chair, and treated one or two persons) ;
City of Syracuse, note 8 (made no substantial expenditures); County of Sanders,
note 7 (expenditures of $3,000 in preparing site for trailer park); Bosse, note 7
(invested some $7,000 towards construction but after he was warned that he was
taking a "calculated risk" in going ahead) ; Winn, note 7 (spent less than $1,000) ;
Town of Lloyd, note 7 (spent $487 of $33,000 projected cost); Warner, note
7 (soil borings and felling of six of seven trees after adoption of ordinance);
Cahn, note 8 (purchase of land only); City of Harrisburg, note 8 (invested
$14,580 in architecet's fees, excavation work and building materials, but the court
implied that it was the defendant's fault that he had not begun construction
before the prohibitory ordinance was adopted); Howe Realty Co., note 7 (had
not begun construction).
10. The attempt of the chiropodist in Pearce v. Lorson, 393 S.W.2d 851 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965) to establish a nonconforming office was described as a "sham
effort." Id. at 854. Under the analysis of the good faith requirement, infra, the
owner would have undoubtedly lacked good faith.
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the courts, or at least the vast majority, will allow zoning estoppel to
be raised as a defense in the category one cases when appropriate.,
For example, in Town of Hillsborough v. Smith,,1 the defendants
were issued a building permit on May 3 for the construction of a dry
cleaning plant. At that time there was no ordinance prohibiting the
plant. On May 22, they paid $9,400 for the lot on which the plant
was to be located and also signed a contract for the construction of
the building for $15,000. On the following day they ordered stakes
driven into the ground to indicate the three corners of the building,
and a day later they placed an order for dry cleaning equipment. The
town adopted a zoning ordinance on May 27 establishing a rural-
residential zone only for that area of the town which included the
defendants' lot; defendants' cleaning plant was not allowed in the
zone. It was not until June 11, however, that they were advised that
their building permit had been revoked by the rezoning. In the in-
terim after adoption of the ordinance, they also had contracted for
the purchase of more equipment and for a franchise to operate a
"martinizing" plant. Defendants refused to terminate their plans.
They made additional payments totaling nealy 511,000 on the con-
tracts they had entered into and had the building on the lot demol-
ished and the lot graded. Finally, the town filed suit to enjoin them
from proceeding with the excavation of the foundation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held for the de-
fendants. It acknowledged that the general rule is that the issuance
of a building permit does not confer rights which cannot be taken
away by a subsequent ordinance. However, the court held that such
rights may be acquired if a property owner, in good faith and in
reliance upon a lawfully issued permit, makes expenditures or incurs
contractual obligations, substantial in amount, prior to the adoption
of the ordinance. Although the defendants' good faith had been
called into question (the city daimed that defendants had been nod-
fied on several occasions that the ordinance was in the process of
adoption), the court held that the jury's verdict for the defendants
11. See, e.g., Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 P. 1033 (1930); Pratt v.
City & County of Denver, 72 Colo. 51, 209 P. 508 (1922); City of Gainesville v.
Bishop, 174 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Renieris v. Village of Skokie,
85 Il. App. 2d 418, 229 N.E.2d 345 (1967); Krekeler v. Board of Adjustment,
422 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1968); Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N.W. 326
(1940), Collins v. Magony, 31 App. Div. 2d 597, 294 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1968);
Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969); Gallagher
v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968).
12. 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
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was conclusive of this question. In response to the town's argument
that the defendants had not changed the physical appearance of their
land until after having been notified of the ordinance, which the
town claimed was the correct test of substantial reliance, the court
held that entering into contracts for the purchase of the land and the
equipment and the construction of the building was sufficient reliance.
According to the court, the town's argument missed this crucial point:
It is not the giving of notice to the town, through a change in the
appearance of the land, which creates the vested property right.
... The basis of his right to build and use his land, in accordance
with the permit issued to him, is his change of his own position
in bona fide reliance upon the permit.23
In addition to the courts which apply the principle of zoning estop-
pel to category one cases, a number of courts have held, with varying
degrees of explicitness and consistency, that a permit once issued can-
not be revoked by a rezoning, even though the owner does not incur
any expenses or obligations in reliance upon it. However, as will be
discussed infra, it remains to be seen whether these decisions actually
mean what they say.
B. Category Two: Reliance upon the Probability of
Issuance of a Permit
In the second category of cases, a property owner applies for a per-
mit and initiates development before it is issued, relying on circum-
stances indicating a probability that it will be issued. The circum-
stances relied on might be that his use or structure is permitted of
right under the zoning ordinance, 4 that a government official has
assured him that he will be granted a permit,15 or that he has obtained
13. Id. at 53, 170 S.E.2d at 909.
14. Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 277 Ala. 522, 173 So. 2d 67 (1963);
Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 149 S.E.2d 489 (1966); Dato v.
Village of Vernon Hills, 91 Il. App. 2d 111, 233 N.E.2d 48 (1968); Smith v. M.
Spiegel & Sons, 31 App. Div. 2d 819, 298 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1969); Verratti v. Town-
ship of Ridley, 416 Pa. 242, 206 A.2d 13 (1965); Pure Oil Div. v. City of
Columbia, - S.C. -, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Southern Rock Prod. Co. v. Self, 279 Ala. 488, 187 So. 2d 244




a favorable court", or appeals board decision-z reversing the denial
of an earlier application. To his dismay, his application nevertheless
is rejected because his proposed use or structure has been prohibited
by a proposed amendment. In situations like this, appeals to the
courts for relief generally have been unsuccessful for they have tended
to hold that one cannot reasonably expect to acquire any rights
until after he has secured a permit.18 Once again it is difficult to tell
how many of these decisions hold that a property owner may never
secure relief if he incurred expenses or obligations without first secur-
ing a permit. It is probably accurate to read most of them as holding
that the owner was not entitled to relief under the circumstances, 19
16. See, e.g., West Coast Advertising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco,
256 Cal. App. 2d 357, 64 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Fiore v. City of
Highland Park, 93 Ill. App. 2d 24, 235 N.E.2d 23 (1968); Andgar Associates,
Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 30 App. Div. 2d 672, 291 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup.
Ct. 1968); Paliotto v. Dickerson, 22 App. Div. 2d 929, 256 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup.
Ct. 1964); Atlantic Beach Towers Constr. Co. v. Michaelis, 21 App. Div. 2d 875,
251 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
17. See, e.g., West Coast Advertising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco,
256 Cal. App. 2d 357, 64 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); People ex rel.
Interchemical Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29 Ill. 2d 446, 194 N.E.2d 199 (1963).
Other forms of governmental conduct which have been relied on in category two
include: advice of village trustees to delay application for building permits for
a trailer park, Dato v. Village of Vernon Hills, 91 II. App. 2d 111, 233 N.E.2d
48 (1968); the issuance of a grading permit which the court held entitled one to
complete grading but not to the automatic issuance of a building permit, Spindler
Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 (Dist. Ct. App.
1966); passage of a resolution to rezone property for manufacturing which was
ineffective because the zoning ordinance could only be changed by amendment,
City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1970).
18. See, e.g., Southern Rock Prod. Co. v. Self, 279 Ala. 488, 187 So. 2d 244
(1966); Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 277 Ala. 522, 173 So. 2d 67 (1963);
West Coast Advertising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 256 Cal. App.
2d 357, 64 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Spindler Realty Corp. v.
Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Slater
v. City Council, 238 Cal. App. 2d 864, 47 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Forrester v. City of Gainesville, 223 Ga. 344, 155 S.E.2d 376 (1967);
Weber v. Village of Skokie, 92 I1. App. 2d 355, 235 N.E.2d 406 (1968);
Naumovich v. Howarth, 92 11. App. 2d 134, 234 N.E.2d 185 (1968); State ex rel.
Jacobson v. City of New Orleans, 166 So. 2d 520 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Rich-
mond Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 254 Md. 244, 255 A.2d 398 (1969);
L.P. Marron & Co. v. Township of River Vale, 54 N.J. Super. 64, 148 A.2d
205 (Super. Ct. 1959); Andgar Associates v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 30 App.
Div. 2d 672, 291 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Penn Twp. v. Yecko Bros.,
420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966); City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d
829 (Tex. 1970).
19. The extent of the owners' reliance in the cases in note 18, supra, is as
follows: Southern Rock Prod. Co. (paying of license fees and entering into royalty
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although it is likely that the courts are more hesitant to grant relief
in this category than in category one. In any event, there are cases
in which the courts have applied the principle of zoning estoppel
when a local government has refused to grant a permit because of a
recently adopted or pending ordinance. 20 Other cases take a some-
what different position and hold that a property owner has a right to
use his property as allowed by the zoning ordinance as of the date of
his application for a permit.21
For example, in Pure Oil Division v. City of Columbia,22 a bank, as
trustee of a comer lot, and an oil company proposed to use the prop-
erty for a filling station, a permitted use under the zoning ordinance.
It was the only piece of property zoned for non-residential use within
a radius of one mile. Prior to applying for a permit, the bank, over
agreements and limestone supply contracts); Grayson (invested $3,517.60 in pre-
paring lots for sale for business purposes; proposed use would have created traffic
hazard at nearby school); West Coast Advertising Co. (no expenditures made or
obligations incurred); Spindler Realty Corp. (incurred expenses in grading prop-
erty in reliance upon grading permit which gave no right to a building permit);
Slater (no substantial work or expenditures); Anderson (purchase of land, ex-
penditure of $500, and investment of time valued at $2,500); Forrester (started
construction after being warned that application was not a permit); Weber (no
reliance on subdivision plat showing three lots, as plaintiff had always treated
the parcels as one lot on which his home was located); Naumovich (purchase of
property conditioned upon obtaining suitable rezoning and expenses amounting
to $900) ; State ex rel. Jacobson (installation of plumbing for trailer park) ; Rich-
mond Corp. (had not begun construction); L.P. Marron & Co. (only purchased
property) ; Andgar Associates (no evidence that landowners had begun construc-
tion); Penn Township (towed a few wrecked automobiles onto the premises as
well as an old bus for an office, and transacted business in the amount of $109.50);
City of Hutchins (purchased property, stored some old tires on it, and poured
foundation for a building for an unknown use).
In most of these cases, the property owner would not have established substantial
reliance under the analysis of that requirement, infra.
20. See, e.g., Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 149 S.E.2d 489
(1966); People ex rel. Interchemical Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29 I1. 2d 446, 194
N.E.2d 199 (1963); Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d
734 (1962); Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299
(1954); State ex rel. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 130
N.W.2d 304 (1964).
21. See, e.g., Sgro v. Howarth, 53 I1. App. 2d 488, 203 N.E.2d 173 (1964);
Verratti v. Township of Ridley, 416 Pa. 242, 206 A.2d 13 (1965); Pure Oil Div.
v. City of Columbia, - S.C. -, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970); cf. Dato v. Village
of Vernon Hills, 91 Ill. App. 2d 111, 233 N.E.2d 48 (1968); United States Home
& Dev. Corp. v. LaMura, 89 N.J. Super. 254, 214 A.2d 538 (Super. Ct. 1965)
which held that the developer should have been allowed a reasonable period of
time between approval of his subdivision and application for building permits,
Ten months was not long enough.
22. - S.C. -, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970).
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the course of a year, demolished several buildings and altered others
to prepare the lot for the station. An application was filed for a zon-
ing permit on January 15 and was approved the following day. Be-
fore the permit was issued, however, neighboring residents appealed
to the board of adjustment, which on February 11 reversed the de-
cision of the zoning administrator. The bank and oil company were
granted a writ of certiorari, requiring that the record of the board be
certified on, or before, May 19. In the meantime, the city council
scheduled a meeting for May 14 to consider rezoning the lot to pro-
hibit the station. The lower court issued a temporary order restrain-
ing the council from rezoning the lot and later ordered that the permit
be issued. On appeal, it was held "that vested rights acquired under
a zoning ordinance in effect at the time of the application for a
permit will be protected even against a change in the zoning ordi-
nance.... ."23 The right protected is "the good faith reliance by the
owner on the right to use his property as permitted under the Zoning
Ordinance in force at the time of the application for a permit." 24
C. Category Three: Reliance upon an Erroneously Issued Permit
The third category consists of cases in which official misunderstand-
ing, misjudgment, or mistake resulted in the erroneous issuance of a
permit for a use or structure that is (1) contrary to the zoning ordi-
nance or (2) lawful but nevertheless contrary to the intentions of the
local government. Most of the courts hold that such permits are in-
valid and confer no rights upon the permittee,25 although their rea-
sons for reaching this result vary widely.26 However, there are de-
23. Id. at -, 173 S.E.2d at 143.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Maguire v. Reardon, 255 U.S. 271 (1921); Weiner v. City of
Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 697, 68 Cal. Rptr. 733, 441 P.2d 293 (1968); Kiker v.
City of Riverdale, 223 Ga. 142, 154 S.E.2d 17 (1967); People ex rel. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 110 I1. App. 2d 354, 249 N.E.2d 232 (1969);
Nassau Realty Co. v. City of New Orleans, 221 So. 2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 1969);
Harris Used Car Co. v. Anne Arundel County, 257 Md. 412, 263 A.2d 520
(1970); Mazo v. City of Detroit, 9 Mich. App. 354, 156 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App.
1968); State ex rel. Rabenau v. Beckemeier, 436 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968); Chatsworth 72nd St. Corp. v. Foley, 29 App. Div. 2d 522, 285 N.Y.S.2d
426 (1967); Stratford Arms, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 429 Pa. 132, 239 A.2d
325 (1968).
26. A city cannot be estopped by an act of its agent which exceeds the authority
conferred upon him. Paulus v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 2d 97, 217 N.E.2d 527
(1965); City of Indianapolis v. Ostrom Realty & Constr. Co., 95 Ind. App. 376,
176 N.E. 246 (1931). City officials have no right to waive the city's power to
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cisions holding that a local government may be estopped if a property
owner relied upon an erroneously issued permit.2 7 For example, in
Dvorson v. City of Chicago,28 the plaintiff was issued a building permit
for a 56-unit apartment building, which violated the zoning ordinance.
Plaintiff had purchased the property for $90,000 in 1963 in reliance
upon the R-4 zoning, a classification permitting multiple dwellings.
A plan calling for 56 units was submitted to the city and approved
in March, 1966. A building permit was issued on March 6, 1968.
Early in September of that year, the property was surveyed and staked
in preparation for excavating the foundation. Almost simultaneously,
the city revoked the permit upon discovering that half of the lot had
been rezoned in July, 1967 to R-3, a classification that prohibited
the building. In addition to the cost of the land, plaintiff had in-
curred expenses of $32,670 in architect's fees, $1,672 in permit fees,
and $2,811 in examination fees. He also had negotiated a Federal
Housing Administration mortgage loan. Both the trial and appeals
courts found for the plaintiff because "the fact that the City issued a
permit based on the plans justified the inference that the same zoning
enforce zoning regulations. Boyd v. Donelon, 193 So. 2d 291 (La. Ct. App.
1966). Persons dealing with municipal officers and agents are charged with
knowledge of their duties and powers and cannot claim to have relied upon their
unauthorized acts. Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 22, 164 A. 743 (1933); Davis v.
City of Abilene, 250 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). "The enforcement
of zoning ordinances would be unravelled if the courts were to allow premature
expenditures to force the hand of plan commissions and city councils." Mazo v.
City of Detroit, 9 Mich. App. 354, 362, 156 N.W.2d 155, 159 (Ct. App. 1968).
"The government or its instrumentalities may not be estopped by acts of its
officers or agents in violation of positive law." Fass v. City of Highland Park,
326 Mich. 19, 28, 39 N.W.2d 336, 340 (1949), quoting from 31 C.J.S., Etoppel,
§ 142.
27. District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1931); City &
County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289, 310 P.2d 296 (1957); City of
Hialeah v. Allmand, 207 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Dvorson v. City
of Chicago, 119 Ill. App. 2d 357, 256 N.E.2d 59 (1970); Township of Pittsfield
v. Malcolm, 375 Mich. 135, 134 N.W.2d 166 (1965); Rubenstein v. City of
Salem, 210 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948); Tantimonaco v. Zoning Bd. of
Review, 102 R.I. 594, 232 A.2d 385 (1967); City of Dallas v. Rosenthal, 239
S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
Although the New York courts hold that one cannot acquire vested rights
through expenditures in reliance upon an invalid building permit, they allow
such expenditures to be considered pursuant to an application for a variance.
The result appears to be the same as if they had applied the principle of zoning
estoppel, although this is debatably an improper use of the variance. See Jayne
Estates, Inc. v. Raynor, 22 N.Y.2d 417, 239 N.E.2d 713, 293 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1968).
28. 119 Ill. App. 2d 357, 256 N.E.2d 59 (1970).
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prevailed in 1968 as in 1966 and 1963 . . ."29 and the plaintiff "had
made a large investment and had become liable for substantial sums
of money." 30 The court's silence seemed sufficient answer to the city's
contention that the plans did not provide for the requisite number
of square feet per dwelling unit, an error that had occurred because
the city had mismeasured the area of a nearby public park in com-
puting the required number of square feet.
An example of an erroneously issued permit for a use that is lawful
but nevertheless contrary to the intentions of the local government is
provided by Township of Springfield v. Bensley.31 The owner applied
for a permit to erect a garden apartment consisting of 252 units.
Through the error of several local officials, who intended to issue a
permit for only 182 units, a permit for 252 units nevertheless was
issued. Since the project was substantially completed before the error
was discovered, the court held that the city was estopped from revok-
ing the permit.
D. Category Four: Reliance upon the Non-Enforcement of a Violation
The fourth category is comprised of cases in which a zoning viola-
tion goes unenforced for a considerable period of time before the local
government takes action. In response to the government's effort to
correct the violation, the owner argues that the city has legitimized,
or at least acquiesced in, the violation through its nonenforcement
and that he has relied upon this. Most of the courts have held that
this is no defense. - The most common reason for denying relief is
29. Id. at 362, 256 N.E.2d at 61.
30. Id.
31. 19 N.J. Super. 147, 88 A.2d 271 (Super. Ct. 1952); accord, Nelson Bldg.
Co. v. Greene, 5 N.J. Misc. 331, 136 A. 503 (Sup. Ct. 1927). In Greene, the
landowner demolished a building worth $10,000 in reliance upon a permit for a
five-story apartment with 30 units. The building inspector had meant to issue a
permit for a four-story apartment with 16 units. The city was estopped to revoke
the permit.
32. See, e.g., Donovan v. City of Santa Monica, 88 Cal. App. 2d 386, 199
P.2d 51 (1948); Ackley v. Kenyon, 152 Conn. 392, 207 A.2d 265 (1965);
Gregory v. City of Wheaton, 23 III. 2d 402, 178 N.E.2d 358 (1961); Leigh v.
City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 607, 83 P.2d 644 (1938); City of Maplewood v.
Provost, 25 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930); Universal Holding Co. v. Town-
ship of North Bergen, 55 N.J. Super. 103, 150 A.2d 44 (Super Ct. 1959); City
of Yonkers v. Rentways, Inc., 304 N.Y. 499, 109 N.E.2d 597 (1952); Swain v.
Board of Adjustment, 433 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Bartlett v. City
of Corpus Christi, 359 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); cf. Kelly v. Wash-
ington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
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that some sort of positive act is necessary to give rise to an estoppel
and that mere inaction is not enough.3 3 A few decisions can be found,
however, allowing relief in category four.34
In Westfield v. City of Chicago3 the plaintiff, a widow, purchased,
in 1954, property which, six years earlier, had been converted into an
apartment in violation of the single-family restriction imposed on it.
In 1957 the city ordered her to restore the premises to single-family
use. The building was an old, three-story house designed for a large
family with several servants. Reconversion would have meant a capital
loss of at least $12,000 plus remodeling expenses of $2,000. Further-
more, it would have been impossible for the widow to live there as
the sole occupant, due to the high expenses of repairing and heating
such an old building. After balancing the hardship she would suffer
against the detriment to the public, the court held the ordinance
unenforceable against her.
An even more extreme example is provided by City of Evanston v.
Robbins.6 In 1954 the defendant purchased a multiple-family dwell-
ing located in a block zoned for single-family dwellings but developed
with multiple and single-family dwellings. In 1957 three city build-
ing officials inspected the building and advised him to make various
alterations to bring it up to the standards for nonconforming multi-
ple dwellings in a single-family dwelling district. He did so at a cost
of about $1,200, and in 1959 he received several letters stating that
all violations had been corrected. In 1964, however, the city's chief
conservation inspector informed the defendant that he would have
to restore the building to a single-family dwelling because it was not
a legal nonconforming use, having been converted to a multiple-
family dwelling sometime after the zoning ordinance was adopted in
1925. When the plaintiff refused, the city brought quasi-criminal
charges against him. After hearing the evidence the trial court dis-
33. Ackley v. Kenyon, 152 Conn. 392, 207 A.2d 265 (1965). Another reason
which has been given is that no vested right can be acquired to violate an ordi-
nance through continued violations. Donovan v. City of Santa Monica, 88 Cal.
App. 2d 386, 199 P.2d 51 (1948).
34. District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1931); City of
Evanston v. Robbins, 117 Ill. App. 2d 278, 254 N.E.2d 536 (1969); Westfield
v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1962); Town of Marble-
head v. Deery, - Mass. -, 254 N.E.2d 234 (1969); Rubinstein v. City of
Salem, 210 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948); City of Passaic v. H.B. Reed &
Co., 70 N.J. Super. 542, 176 A.2d 27 (Super. Ct. 1961); Town of Highland
Park v. Marshall, 235 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
35. 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1962).
36. 117 Ill. App. 2d 278, 254 N.E.2d 536 (1969).
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missed the complaint, and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court concluded that "[hlere the property was so used for 25 years
and there is no specific testimony whatsoever as to a tendency to
deteriorate the neighborhood. ' ' 3 7 In holding the city estopped, the
court noted that "[m]unicipal corporations, as well as private corpora-
tions and individuals, are bound by the principles of fair dealing."38
III. WHAT CONSTITUTEs GOOD FAITH?
The first element of zoning estoppel requires that the property
owner "relied in good faith" on the conduct of the government.39 In
essence it focuses upon the mental attitude of the owner when he
acted. The way the element is stated here implies the existence of
two sub-elements-reliance and good faith. In fact, the owner's re-
liance, or lack of it, comes into question under element three where
the courts attempt to evaluate the hardship he would suffer were the
city allowed to proceed.41
Good faith is an elusive element, because most of the opinions do
not define it. Others define what constitutes a lack of good faith,41
37. Id. at 285, 254 N.E.2d at 540.
38, Id. at 286, 254 N.E.2d at 541, quoting from New-Mark Builders, Inc. v.
City of Aurora, 90 Ill. App. 2d 98, 233 N.E.2d 44 (1967).
39. Good faith is a merger of two of Pomeroy's elements. First, the truth
concerning the material facts which were misrepresented must have been un-
known to the party seeking relief "not only at the time of the conduct which
amounts to the representation or concealment, but also at the time when that
conduct was acted upon by him." POMEROY § 810. He adds that if the party
seeking relief "had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could acquire
the knowledge so that it would be negligence on his part to remain ignorant by
not using those means he cannot claim to have been misled . . . ." Id. Second,
"there can be no estoppel, unless the party who alleges it relied upon the repre-
sentation, was induced to act by it, and thus relying and induced, did take some
action." Id. § 812. The combination of these elements is much stricter than
the good faith requirement of zoning estoppel, and they would disqualify many
owners who are entitled to relief under the principle of zoning estoppel.
40. The requirement of substantial reliance is discussed infra.
41. Fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment on the part of the landowner
precludes good faith in all four categories. See, e.g., Kiker v. City of Riverdale,
223 Ga. 142, 154 S.E.2d 17 (1967) (the license application for a prohibited
automobile wrecking business did not reveal the location nor the nature of the
business) ; People ex rel. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 110 Ill. App.
2d 354, 249 N.E.2d 232 (1969) (the plans submitted for a building permit devi-
ated from a court order in that they did provide for a 10 foot side yard, one of the
salient issues in the litigation) ; City of Chicago v. Zellers, 64 Ill. App. 2d 24, 212
N.E.2d 737 (1963) (applicant who had obtained building permit that did not
satisfy minimum side-yard requirements by submitting plans containing erroneous
information started excavating a few hours later); Boyd v. Donelon, 193 So. 2d
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rather than what is good faith. Still, there are a few decisions which
give some hints as to the meaning of the element, and the rest can be
inferred from the facts presented. However, two things are clear: the
meaning of good faith varies among the four factual categories, and
there are minority variations.
A. Category One
In category one, the courts will find that a property owner acted in
good faith if, knowing that rezoning was at least possible, he did not
accelerate his development or increase his investment or obligations
in an effort to establish such an apparent degree or amount of reliance
as to prevent the rezoning. It is probably accurate to paraphrase this
test as requiring that the owner act with honest intentions. On the
one hand, the test deems that an owner has acted in good faith if he
received his permit and began construction in the absence of any
opposition and proceeded at a normal pace of construction.42 On
the other hand, it bars from relief an owner who, in the face of in-
tense public opposition, raced to finish or substantially complete con-
struction before the government could rezone his land.43 Similarly,
291 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (developer must have been aware that building permit
contained numerous zoning and building code violations as he had more than
25 years experience as an apartment builder in the area) ; Stratford Arms, Inc. v.
Board of Adjustment, 429 Pa. 132, 239 A.2d 325 (1968) (plaintiff discovered
error in description of property after the plans had been approved but neverthe-
less went ahead with construction); Jelinski v. Eggers, 34 Wis. 2d 84, 148
N.W.2d 750 (1967) (defendant obtained a building permit by telling the build-
ing inspector that the board of appeals had no objection to his proposed garage
which would violate the side lot requirements).
See also Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 183 Kan. 19, 325 P.2d 382
(1958); Brady v. City of Keene, 90 N.H. 99, 4 A.2d 658 (1939); City of Dallas
v. Rosenthal, 239 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (dicta); Wikstrom v. City
of Laramie, 37 Wyo. 389, 262 P. 22 (1927) (dicta); cf. City of Philadelphia v.
Wyszynski, 381 Pa. 153, 112 A.2d 327 (1955) (not a building permit).
42. See, e.g., Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1966); Sautto v. Eden-
boro Apts., 84 N.J. Super. 461, 202 A.2d 466 (Super. Ct. 1964); Bosse v. City
of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523, 226 A.2d 99 (1967); Collins v. Magony, 31 App.
Div. 2d 597, 294 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1968); Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276
N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969); Price v. Smith, 416 Pa. 560, 207 A.2d 887
(1965); accord, Krekeler v. Board of Adjustment, 422 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1968);
cf., City of Gainesville v. Bishop, 174 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
43. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Mount Holly Twp., 135 N.J.L. 112, 51 A.2d
19 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Stowe v. Burke, 255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961);
A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586
(1954); accord, Gold v. Building Comm., 334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 367 (1939); Graham
Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564 (1953); Rice v.
Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y.S. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 225 App. Div.
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it denies relief to an owner who contracts for $50,000 in construction
materials to augment his expenses of $5,000 in architect's fees.44 In
most of these cases, the courts seem to apply a subjective test to de-
termine whether the owner acted in good faith.
There are a number of cases, however, which suggest that an objec-
tive measure of good faith is applied, i.e., whether a reasonable prop-
erty owner would have acted in the face of such a high probability
that the property would be rezoned."5 Implicit in this is the convic-
tion that if a reasonable owner would not have acted, the owner in
question must have been trying to secure an advantage. It is unclear,
however, how great the probability of rezoning must be to establish
a lack of good faith. The fact that the local government possessed
the power to rezone the owner's property cannot be inconsistent with
good faith, for surely many of the owners who were granted relief
knew that the local government possessed such power. Neither does
it appear that most courts find a sufficient probability established by
the fact that an amendment is pending before the local legislature. 46
One court has noted that "an unpassed bill in City Council ... has
179, 232 N.Y.S. 506 (1929). Cf. Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368(1960), where the town raced to rezone the land to prohibit a church, while
the religious body raced to secure a permit and begin construction. The church
group was held not to have lacked good faith, and the court chastized the city
for trying to prohibit the church.
Whether or not the owner acted in good faith is normally a question for thejury and its verdict is conclusive. See Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C.
48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
44. Although these figures are hypothetical, a number of similar cases have
arisen. See Call Bond & Mortgage Co. v. City of Sioux City, 219 Iowa 572, 259
N.W. 33 (1935) (oral contract for five thousand bricks); Brady v. City of Keene,
90 N.H. 99, 4 A.2d 658 (1939) (entering into lease with oil company).
45. Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 139 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962), rev'd, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963) ; Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H.
523, 226 A.2d 99 (1967); accord, Glickman v. Parish of Jefferson, 224 So. 2d
141 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Salisbury v. Borough of Ridgefield, 137 N.J.L. 515,
60 A.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Clifton, 16 N.J. Super.
265, 84 A.2d 555 (Super. Ct. 1951) ; A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensing-
ton, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); Graham Corp. v. Board of Zoning
Appeal, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564 (1953); Appeal of A.N. "AB" Young Co.,
360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948). Contra, Miller v. Dassler, 155 N.Y.S.2d
975 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960);
Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958).
46. See, e.g., Miller v. Dassler, 155 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1956); accord,
Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960). But see Stowe v. Burke,
255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961). In Miller the court held that the land-
owner "had a right to assume that the proposed ordinance might not be carried
when put to a vote." 155 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
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no more authority than a scribbled note on the back of an envelope
in the pocket of a legislator."47 On the other hand, several courts
have found that an owner lacked good faith where he ignored intense
public opinion against him or a temporary injunction ordering him
to halt construction. 4 For a time the Florida courts took the most
extreme position by holding that an owner acted at his peril if he
knew, or should have had "good reason to believe," that "the official
mind might change as it did."49 The use of this test proved difficult
to applys0 and has apparently been abandoned for a more conven-
tional one.51 The Florida cases aside, there is uncertainty whether
the decisions under discussion actually applied or meant to apply an
objective standard. It seems more likely that they made reference to
the high probability of rezoning to substantiate their conclusion that
the owner had deliberately tried to thwart the rezoning.
47. Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 226, 157 A.2d 368, 369 (1960).
48. Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 P. 1033 (1930); Sakolsky v. City of
Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963) (dicta); Bosse v. City of Portsmouth,
107 N.H. 523, 226 A.2d 99 (1967); State ex rel. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Board
of Appeals, 21 Wis. 2d 516, 124 N.W.2d 809 (1963); accord, A. J. Aberman,
Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); cfi. City of
Lansing v. Dawley, 247 Mich. 394, 225 N.W. 500 (1920). But see Freeman v.
Hague, 106 N.J.L. 137, 147 A. 553 (Ct. E. & A. 1929) (actual fraud required);
Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960).
49. Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 139 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962), rev'd, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963).
50. In Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 139 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962), rcv'd, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963), an adjacent landowner sought an in-
junction to restrain the defendant from proceeding with construction. The suit
was eventually dismissed but not before defendant's permit was revoked by a
rezoning. Likewise relief was denied in: Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d
274 (Fla. 1955) to an owner who proceeded after the first reading and publica-
tion of a proposed rezoning; Miami Shores Village v. William N. Brockway Post
124, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So. 2d 33 (1945) to an owner who acted in the face of
strong public opinion that eventually led to the election of new officials who
revoked his permit; City of Miami v. State ex tel. Ergene, Inc., 132 So. 2d 474
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) to an owner who relied upon a resolution passed by
a 3 to 2 vote, knowing that one of the commissioners voting for him might be
replaced, and the resolution rescinded only 35 days after its passage. In contrast,
relief was granted to an owner when the hostility was kept hidden until the reso-
lution authorizing him to build a drive-in theatre was rescinded. Bregor v. Britton,
75 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1954).
51. With the reversal of the appellate court in Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables,
151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963), the Florida courts joined the majority view and
began to apply a subjective test to measure the owner's good faith. See City of
Gainesville v. Bishop, 174 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), where relief
was granted to an owner under circumstances substantially similar to those in





It is difficult to discuss the meaning of good faith in category two
because very few cases have dealt with the question. The owner's
good faith is probably immaterial to those courts which hold that one
cannot reasonably expect to acquire any rights until after a permit
has been issued 2 Those courts which are willing to grant relief,
under the principle of zoning estoppelI or the principle that one ha
a right to use his property as allowed as of the date of his applica-
tion,54 apparently require that the owner possessed a mental attitude
equivalent to that required in category one. The controlling question
thus is whether the owner deliberately tried to increase his equities
in some way. For example, an owner would lack good faith if he
applied for a permit with knowledge that a rezoning had been pro-
posed and then brought a court action to speed issuance of the per-
mit., Good faith would likewise be lacking if one hastened to estab-
lish the right to operate a junk yard by moving wrecked cars onto
his property without any approval or permit a few days before the
effective date of a new zoning ordinance.56 Beyond these examples,
the cases offer few insights into the meaning of good faith in category
two, but it appears that the "honest intentions" characterization given
to the meaning of good faith under category one would generally be
applicable.
C. Categories Three and Four
Categories three and four present similar situations with regard to
an owner's good faith. Good faith can apparently exist only if the
owner in category three was ignorant of the fact that his permit was
erroneously issued5 7 and in category four that his use or structure
violated the zoning ordinance.58 Actual knowledge of these facts
would seem to automatically constitute a lack of good faith.5 9 But
52. See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
53. See note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
54. See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
55. See Slater v. City Council, 238 Cal. App. 2d 864, 47 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965).
56. See Penn Twvp. v. Yecko Bros., 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966).
57. See cases cited note 27 supra.
58. See cases cited note 34 supra.
59. See the category three cases cited note 41 supra, and Ashland Lumber Co.
v. Williams, 411 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1969) (the fact that the owner started con-
struction within 25 days of the issuance of an invalid building permit was treated
as casting doubt upon his good faith); Kent County Planning Inspector v. Abel,
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some of the cases which have granted relief can also be read as im-
posing an even higher requirement for good faith: the owner must
have, in effect, been duped by the local government into believing
that his permit was properly issued or that his use or structure satis-
fied the zoning ordinance. 0 Which requirement the courts actually
apply remains to be seen, and possibly both are. There are simply
too few cases to be sure. Both requirements, however, are apparently
subjective and more stringent than the requirements applied in cate-
gories one and two.
IV. WHAT FoRmS OF GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT MAY BE RELIED ON?
The second element of zoning estoppel concerns the conduct of the
local government that was relied on. Relative to the other two ele-
ments-good faith and substantial reliance-the governmental conduct
element is not especially important to the outcome of the case. If a
court is willing to allow zoning estoppel and finds that good faith
and substantial reliance were present, it will find some sort of govern-
mental conduct upon which the owner can be said to have relied.
Nevertheless, discussing this element helps to clarify conceptually the
principle of zoning estoppel.61
246 Md. 395, 228 A.2d 247 (1967) (after being informed that his permit was
invalid, the owner, nevertheless, proceeded with construction of a bulkhead and
covered slips for a marina); Upper Moreland v. Meade, 420 Pa. 613, 218 A.2d
271 (1966) (in issuing a permit for more units than shown on the developer's
plans, the town officials relied upon the advice of the township solicitor who was
also the developer's attorney).
For a case falling in category four, see City of San Marino v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 180 Cal. App. 2d 657, 4 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1960) (the owner had
long known that use of his property for a parking lot was in violation of the
zoning ordinance, and there was no showing that the city intended that its
acquiesence should be relied upon).
60. Dvorson v. City of Chicago, 119 11. App. 2d 357, 256 N.E.2d 59 (1970);
City of Evanston v. Robbins, 117 Ill. App. 2d 278, 254 N.E.2d 536 (1969);
People ex rel. Beverly Bank v. Hill, 75 Ill. App. 2d 69, 221 N.E.2d 40 (1966);
Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1962); Township
of Pittsfield v. Malcolm, 375 Mich. 135, 134 N.W.2d 166 (1965); City of Passaic
v. H.B. Reed & Co., 70 N.J. Super. 542, 176 A.2d 27 (Super. Ct. 1961); Tanti-
monaco v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 102 R.I. 594, 232 A.2d 385 (1967).
61. The governmental conduct requirement of zoning estoppel reflects three
of the elements of equitable estoppel identified by Pomeroy. First, he states that
"[tjhere must be conduct-acts, language, or silence amounting to representation
or concealment of material facts." POAXEROY § 805, supra note 2. Second, "[t]hese
facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of said conduct, or, at
least, the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily
imputed to him." Id. Third, "[tjhe conduct must be done with the intention, or
at least the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under
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Each of the four categories has a predominant form of governmental
conduct. In category one, the governmental conduct relied on is gen-
erally the issuance of a permit.62 To the owner, the permit represents
a material fact-he can develop his structure or use without fear of
permit revocation by rezoning. This is highly fictitious, of course, since
the permit does not confer immunity from a zoning change. Never-
theless, it provides a peg on which to hang the owner's reliance. Also
falling into category one are those cases in which an owner began
development in the absence of any applicable ordinance. 3 Here the
governmental conduct relied on is the representation that one could
complete construction regardless of a change in the zoning require-
ments or the imposition of requirements. In category two, the most
common basis for the owner's reliance is that his application was for
a permitted use or structure and that other applicants always had
been granted the same permit."4 The basis for the owner's reliance
is clearer still when he relied on official assurances that his permit
would be granted.0 In other cases, the government's conduct may
be viewed as an omission to inform the owner promptly that his in-
tended use or structure had, or might be, prohibited and his applica-
tion disapproved." In some of the cases, the owner also had secured
a favorable court decision 6 7 or an appeals board order68 which he
such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted
upon." Id. However, he points out that, "[t]here are several familiar species in
which it is simply impossible to ascribe any intention or even expectation to the
party estopped that his conduct will be acted upon by the one who afterwards
claims the benefit of the estoppel." Id.
The first of these elements really presents two questions: (1) what kinds of
conduct amount to a representation or concealment upon which an owner may
justifiably rely; and (2) what kinds of material facts must have been represented
and concealed? Although the courts do not identify the representation or con-
cealment and the material fact in each factual category, this has been done in
the text of this article to establish a clearer conceptual framework for under-
standing the principle of zoning estoppel. The other two elements are even less
relevant to zoning estoppel. In many cases the government neither knows the
true state of the material facts nor does it intend that the property owner rely
upon its conduct.
62. See cases cited note II supra, and accompanying text.
63. Id.
6 t. See cases cited note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
65. See cases cited note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Cos Corp. v. City of Evanston, 27 Ill. 2d 570, 190 N.E.2d 364
(1963); Illinois Mason Contractors v. Wheat, 19 Ill. 2d 462, 167 N.E.2d 216
(1960); and People ex rel. Beverly Bank v. Hill, 75 Ill. App. 2d 79, 221 N.E.2d
40 (1966).
67. See cases cited note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
68. See cases cited note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
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believed gave him the right to a permit and immunity from rezoning.
Although such decisions cannot be attributed to the local government,
they can be viewed as a reasonable basis for the owner's false sense of
security. In category three, the government's conduct is the issuance
of a permit, whether invalid 6 or mistakenly issued,70 coupled with the
government's failure to discover this promptly and inform the owner.
Finally, in category four, the conduct relied upon is the government's
nonenforcement of the zoning ordinance over a long period of time,"
thus misleading the owner into believing that there is no violation or
that it has been ratified.
It is impossible to impute any intention or expectation to the local
government that some of the forms of conduct discussed here would
be relied on,72 especially by the specific owner who did so. In fact,
under the laws of zoning and building permits which normally have
governed these cases, the owner has no right to rely on the govern-
ment's conduct, at least to the extent that he did. Still, in most of the
cases, it is difficult to argue that it was unreasonable for the owner to
rely on the government's conduct, and this is important to understand-
ing the cases. The cases allowing zoning estoppel hold, in effect, that
local governments while exercising their zoning powers are accountable
for their actions if they lead reasonable men astray. This is not to
say that they hold the governments to the same standards as reason-
able men, but they represent a definite step away from the immunity
long enjoyed by local governments while performing governmental
functions.
V. WHAT Is SUBSTANTIAL RELIANCE?
The third element of zoning estoppel requires that the owner "made
a substantial change in position or incurred extensive obligations and
expenses." 73 Concern is for the economic hardship which the owner
would suffer were the government allowed to have its way. The ques-
tion which must be answered is: what stage of construction must be
reached, or what amount of financial involvement or commitment
69. See cases cited note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
70. See cases cited note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
71. See cases cited note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
72. See the discussion of equitable estoppel in note 61 supra.
73. The substantial reliance requirement is analagous to Pomeroy's sixth ele-
ment. He states that the party claiming the estoppel must act upon the conduct
of the other "in such a manner as to change his position for the worse; in other
words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender
or forego or alter what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted
to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it." POAEROY § 805.
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must be present, before it would be inequitable to allow the govern-
ment to proceed? The substantial reliance element is the one which
most often determines the outcome of the cases. It is also the ele-
ment which varies the most between jurisdictions, since at least three
different tests have been developed for measuring reliance.
A. The Set Quantum Test
A majority of the courts utilize what may be described as the "set
quantum test." Under this test, an owner is entitled to relief if he has
changed his position beyond a certain set degree or amount, measured
quantitatively. The problem with this test is that the courts have not
set the requisite degree or amount with any precision. From a na-
tional perspective, it is impossible to state with certainty the degree of
involvement that the courts require to establish substantial reliance,
although the cases within specific states may be consistent.
The majority of the courts appear to require some physical con-
struction to establish substantial reliance. The courts have found sub-
stantial reliance in the initiation of construction of the building it-
self,71 the beginning of excavation,7 the pouring of the foundation,7 6
74. See City of Hialeah v. Allmand, 207 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(owner had commenced construction of an industrial plant); Collins v. Magony,
31 App. Div. 2d 597, 294 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1968) (work completed included
excavation, grading, footings, and some foundation walls of mushroom plant);
Jayne Estates, Inc. v. Raynor, 28 App. Div. 2d 720, 281 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1967) (ex-
penditures of over $60,000 for the construction of foundations, pilings, and the
completion of two apartment buildings) ; Friend v. Feriola, 23 App. Div. 2d 822,
258 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1965) (work on building had reached "an advanced state
of completion"). Contra, Ashland Lumber Co. v. Williams, 411 S.W.2d 909 (Ky.
1966), (building was 90 per cent finished, but the fact that the owner had com-
menced construction within 25 days after issuance of an invalid permit was treated
as casting doubt on his good faith).
In a number of cases in which relief was granted, the building was completed
before the city changed its position. Tankersley Bros. v. City of Fayetteville, 227
Ark. 130, 296 S.W.2d 412 (1956), Brett v. Building Comm'r, 250 Mass. 73, 145
N.E. 269 (1924); Township of Pittsfield v. Malcolm, 375 Mich. 135, 134 N.W.2d
166 (1965); Price v. Smith, 416 Pa. 560, 207 A.2d 887 (1965).
75. See City of Evansville v. Gaseteria, 51 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931) ; Graham
Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564 (1953) (dictum);
Crow v. Board of Adjustment, 227 Iowa 324, 288 N.W. 145 (1939); Sanden-
burgh v. Michigame Oil Co. 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707 (1930); Crecca v.
Nucera, 52 N.J. Super. 279, 145 A.2d 477 (Super. Ct. 1958) (dictum); Rice v.
Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y.S. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (dictum), aff'd, 225
App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y.S. 506 (1929); In re W.P. Rose Builders' Supply Co.,
202 N.C. 496, 163 S.E. 462 (1932) (dictum).
76. See Graham Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564
(1953) (dictum).
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and the installation of underground pipes or tanks.7 7 Some courts
have granted relief where the only expenses which the owner had
incurred were connected with preparing the land for development. 8
Of course, the facts of few cases are this simple. More often there are
additional forms of reliance, such as entering into construction con-
tracts and financing arrangements, 79 which the courts undoubtedly
take into account even though they state that some physical construc-
tion is required.
To add to the confusion, a minority of courts do not require the
owner to have begun physical construction. They will grant relief if
the owner merely incurred sufficient expenses and contractual obliga-
tions. These courts have been equally inconsistent with respect to the
requisite amount of financial involvement or commitment that is re-
quired. 0 Most courts, however, agree that the mere purchase of land
without more is not sufficient reliance.81 Apparently, they reason
77. See City of Evansville v. Gaseteria, 51 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931); In re
W.P. Rose Builders' Supply Co., 202 N.C. 496, 163 S.E.2d 462 (1932) (dictum).
Contra, State ex reL. Jacobson v. City of New Orleans, 166 So. 2d 520 (La. Ct.
App. 1964).
78. See Rice v. Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y.S. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1928),
aff'd, 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y.S. 506 (1929); Pure Oil Div. v. City of Co-
lumbia, - S.C. -, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970). Contra, Grayson v. City of
Birmingham, 277 Ala. 522, 173 So. 2d 67 (1963); Weiner v. City of Los Angeles,
68 Cal. 2d 697, 68 Cal. Rptr. 733, 441 P.2d 293 (1968); County of Sanders v.
Moore, 182 Neb. 377, 155 N.W.2d 317 (1967); Warner v. W & 0, Inc., 263
N.C. 37, 138 S.E.2d 782 (1964).
79. See, e.g., Dvorson v. City of Chicago, 119 Ill. App. 2d 357, 256 N.E.2d
59 (1970) (in addition to the cost of the land, the developer had incurred $32,770
in architect's fees, $2,811 in examination fees, $1,672 in permit fees, and had
negotiated a Federal Housing Administration loan); Murrell v. Wolff, 408
S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1966) (developer had invested substantial sums of money in
planning a large project which integrated commercial, multi-family, and single-
family uses); State ex rel. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Hendrickson, 393 S.W.2d
481 (Mo. 1965) (purchase of land, commencement of grading work, and incurring
of financial obligations in excess of $64,000); Tantimonaco v. Zoning Bd. of
Review, 102 R.I. 594, 232 A.2d 385 (1967) ($2,899 preparing land, over $1,000
in legal fees, and $39,000 for construction contract).
80. See Sautto v. Edenboro Apts., 84 N.J. Super. 461, 202 A.2d 466 (Super.
Ct. 1964) (expenses primarily in the form of planning a high-rise apartment
building and negotiating FHA insurance commitment for a mortgage loan of
$842,000); Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969)
(contracts for construction, franchise, and dry cleaning equipment).
81. See Anderson v. Pleasant Hill, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (purchase of land, expenditure of $500, and investment
of time value at $2,500); Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965) (purchase of property); Stone Mountain Industries, Inc. v.
Wilhite, 221 Ga. 269, 144 S.E.2d 357 (1965) (purchase of property); Sgro v.
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that land is a readily marketable commodity that can always be sold
without loss or utilized for some use other than the one in question.
These examples indicate that the courts have experienced difficulty
in establishing and applying a quantitative standard. The great varia-
tions between the cases probably reflect the fact that the judgment
as to the degree of construction or the amount of expenditures or
commitments required is ultimately subjective and thus highly vari-
able. The variations may also reflect the fact that courts, despite
their efforts to establish a test for all cases, have been unable to avoid
the temptation of examining whether the owner in the case before
them would suffer a hardship if the government were allowed to
proceed. Thus, a $10,000 loss would have little effect on Standard Oil
of New Jersey but would be disastrous to the proverbial widow who
would lose her life savings, and this is likely to sway a court. To make
the set quantum approach more precise, some courts have announced,
on occasion, that they will test for reliance by examining whether the
completed work amounted to a "substantial" ratio of the contemplated
work.-2 However, no instances were found in which the courts of a
particular state tried this approach frequently enough to provide any
basis for evaluating it.
Another factor which undoubtedly complicates the problem of de-
termining what is substantial reliance is that the measure of reliance
may change in many of the states depending upon the factual category
of the case that is presented. In other words, less reliance may be
required in categories one and two, than in three and four. 8 An
Howarth, 53 Ill. App. 2d 488, 203 N.E.2d 173 (1964) (purchase of property);
Lutz v. City of New Albany Plan. Comm'n, 230 Ind. 74, 101 N.E.2d 187 (1951)(purchase of property); Montgomery v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 135 Ind. App.
437, 193 N.E.2d 142 (1963) (purchase of property and architect's fees); Build-
ing Inspector v. Werlin Realty, 349 Mass. 623, 211 N.E.2d 338 (1965) (purchase
of property); State ex rel. Berndt v. Iten, 259 Minn. 77, 106 N.W.2d 366(1960) (purchase of one-half of property and option on other half). Contra, City
of Gainesville v. Bishop, 174 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (purchase of
property the only reliance).
82. Winn. v. Lamoy Realty Corp., 100 N.H. 280, 124 A.2d 211 (1956); Miller
v. Dassler, 155 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Stowe v. Burke, 255 N.C. 527,
122 S.E.2d 374 (1961).
83. An attempt was made to test this proposition by surveying those more
recent Illinois cases in which the outcome hinged primarily upon whether there
was substantial reliance on the part of the owner. Illinois was selected because
it is apparently the only state in which the courts are willing to grant relief with
any frequency in all four categories of cases. However, the results were incon-
clusive.
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attorney faced with a case in which zoning estoppel may be applicable
should carefully study the cases from his jurisdiction to determine
whether the measure of reliance shifts between the categories of cases.
B. The Balancing Test
The second test for measuring substantial reliance utilizes the famil-
iar approach of balancing the equities as they appear in the particular
case. The Illinois courts use the balancing test the most often,84
while the courts of a few other states use it occasionally to dispose
of really close cases.85 In utilizing the test, Illinois courts attempt to
weigh the right of the property owner to use his land and the ex-
penses and obligations he incurred against the public interests pre-
sented. If the owner tips the scale in his favor, he establishes sub-
stantial reliance. For example, in Nott v. Wolff,86 the lessees planned
to build a motor hotel in an unsuccessful commercial zone. After a
substantial fee had been paid to an architect and a construction con-
tract signed, the zoning was amended to prohibit the hotel. On appeal,
the court held:
Little gain is shown to the public by preventing the erection of
this motel. The immediate area is commercial and there is little
evidence of injury to the area.... There is some suggestion of in-
jury to values of residences, but they are, in fact, relatively remote.
The gain to the public is small as compared to the hardship of
the property owner. Thus there is no valid basis . . . for the
exercise of the police power in amending the zoning ordinance
and restricting the use of this property.8 7
84. Nott v. Wolff, 18 Ill. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960) (discussed at note
86 and accompanying text, infra); Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526,
187 N.E.2d 208 (1962) (discussed at note 35 and accompanying text, supra);
Dvorson v. City of Chicago, 119 I1. App. 2d 357, 256 N.B.2d 59 (1970) (dis-
cussed at note 28 and accompanying text, supra); City of Evanston v. Robbins,
117 Ill. App. 2d 278, 254 N.E.2d 536 (1969) (discussed at note 36 and accom-
panying text, supra); Paulus v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 2d 97, 217 N.E.2d 527
(1966) (defendant was forced to remove sign located too close to an expressway
because it posed a threat to the public health and general welfare).
85. See Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 277 Ala. 522, 173 So. 2d 67, (1963);
Graham Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564 (1953);
Rubinstein v. City of Salem, 210 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948); Tremarco
Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960); Brady v. City of Keene, 90
N.H. 99, 4 A.2d 658 (1939); Crecca v. Nucera, 52 N.J. Super. 279, 145 A.2d
477 (Super. Ct. 1958); Tantimonaco v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 102 R.I. 594,
232 A.2d 385 (1967).
86. 18 Ill. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960).
87. Id. at 369, 163 N.E.2d at 813.
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The merit of the balancing test is that it results in fairer decisions,
because the facts of each case are carefully weighed. Its disadvantage
is that it creates even more uncertainty than the set quantum test. It
is generally difficult to predict whether an owner will be granted relief
until his case has been litigated.
C. The Pennsylvania Test
A third test, the Pennsylvania test, has been used occasionally in
several states and applies only to the category one and two cases. The
rule is: (1) an application for a permit for a permitted use cannot
be refused, unless an ordinance prohibiting it is legally pending at
the time,"s and (2) once a permit for such a use is issued, it cannot
be revoked, even if the permittee does not incur expenses or obliga-
tions in reliance upon it.89 Furthermore, if a permit is issued for an
initial stage of construction, such as excavation, and is relied on, any
additional permits necessary to complete the project cannot be re-
fused.90 This rule was a reaction to the frequent spectacle of a per-
mittee's racing to establish a nonconforming use while the local gov-
ernment raced to amend the ordinance and halt construction. After
struggling to determine the outcome of several of these races, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court formulated the present rule.91 The
Washington Supreme Court purports to have adopted the same rule
with respect to the category one cases, although it seems to have mis-
read a decision which it rendered earlier.92 Similarly, the Supreme
88. Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968);
Varratti v. Township of Ridley, 416 Pa. 242, 206 A.2d 13 (1965); Lhormer v.
Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963); Lower Merion Twp. v. Frankel, 358
Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900 (1948); Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930).
89. Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968); cf.
Gold v. Building Comm., 334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 367 (1939).
90. Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968).
91. Id. at 304, 247 A.2d at 573.
92. In Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958), the WashingtonSupreme Court announced a rule that protected a property owner if (1) he ap-
plied for a permit for a use or structure which was allowed under the ordinance
then in effect and (2) the permit was actually issued. Upon issuance of the
permit, the court said that he would have a vested right that related back to the
date of the filing of his application. Recognizing that this was not the majority
rule, the court stated, "[n]otwithstanding . . . we prefer to have a date certain
upon which the right vests to construct in accordance with the building permit."
53 Wash. 2d at 130, 331 P.2d 857. Recently, however, in two cases in which
estoppel was not a central issue, the Washington court stated that the right to
build accrues when the permit is applied for and approvingly cited a number of
Pennsylvania cases. Jones v. Town of Woodway, 70 Wash. 2d 987, 425 P.2d 904(1967); Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash. 2d 325, 382 P.2d 628 (1963). These
rules are not the same. Under the rule in Hull v. Hunt, supra, it appears that
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Court of South Carolina has recently applied the rule to a category
two case.
3
The Pennsylvania test has the advantage of certainty, since the only
question which must be determined is whether the prohibitory ordi-
nance was legally pending at the time of the application. Further-
more, it protects property owners against the ad hoc rejection of
applications to use their property, although it apparently only affords
protection with respect to permitted uses and not those permitted
conditionally. However, there is one serious problem with the rule.
It exposes local governments to the threat of a flood of applications
for permitted uses whenever an extensive zoning amendment is con-
templated. Such an amendment will normally be preceded by a long
period of study, and an astute developer should have no difficulty
learning of it. He need only file his application before the amend-
ment is formally introduced in the local legislature in order to receive
his permit, regardless of whether the long study has demonstrated
that his use will pose a threat to the public interest. In a state in
which interim zoning is permitted, this problem could possibly be
avoided by freezing the status quo during the study period. In Penn-
sylvania, however, the court's position on the effect of pending ordi-
nances apparently leads to the conclusion that an interim ordinance
would have no effect on an application because of the theory that an
application can be refused only when the ordinance which will perma-
nently prohibit the use has been formally introduced. 94
the permit actually had to be issued before the owner would be protected; under
the Pennsylvania rule the owner need only apply for the permit to receive protec-
tion. Perhaps the court wisely abandoned the rule in Hull v. Hunt. That rule
seems vulnerable to delaying tactics by the local government since the permit
must in fact be issued before the owner acquires any rights. The local government
could apparently delay issuance of the permit long enough to rezone the property,
leaving the property owner with no recourse.
93. Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, - S.C. -, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970)
(discussed at note 22 and accompanying text, supra).
94. This conclusion is also supported by the author's impression of the Pennsyl-
vania courts, especially its supreme court. They are far more protective of the
rights of property owners than most of the other state courts. See, e.g., Chief
Justice Bell's concurring opinion in Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Ad-
justment, - Pa. -, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), in which he argued that the right
to own property and use it as one pleased was "one of the two basic differences
between America and Communism. Then along came zoning ... ." Id. at -,
268 A.2d at 771. Admittedly, Chief Justice Bell does not speak for the entire
court, but it is noteworthy that in Kit-Mar, in which a majority overturned an
ordinance requiring two and three-acre minimum lots, three members of the
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VI. AN EVALUATION OF ZONING EsToPPEL AND
SOiME SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
A. The Problem of Determining Substantial Reliance
The element of zoning estoppel most important to the outcome of
tne cases and the most troublesome for the courts is substantial reli-
ance. This is not to say that the good faith and the governmental
conduct elements are not important at times, but only that the re-
quirements that they establish are so minimal that they are generally
met with ease. As a result, the cases usually hinge on whether there
was substantial reliance.
The courts have encountered two problems in applying the sub-
stantial reliance requirement: (1) establishing a test for all cases and
(2) applying that test with consistency in subsequent cases.
Those courts which have adopted the set quantum test have, in
effect, opted for certainty. The test theoretically guarantees certainty
because it measures reliance on the basis of a set degree or amount of
reliance which supposedly indicates whether a hardship would be
suIffecred in all cases. Most of the courts utilizing the set quantum test
initially established the beginning of construction as the minimum
requirement for relief. Sooner or later, they were faced with a case
in which this criterion was not met but in which the owner would
have suffered a hardship if relief were denied. The tendency appar-
ently has been to solve this dilemma by either somehow fitting the
facts of the case into the court's stated test or by disposing of the case
in favor of the owner on some basis other than his reliance. Obviously,
neither approach does much to promote consistency among cases.
This dilemma also seems to have resulted in a tendency over the
sears toward lowering the test for substantial reliance to encompass
the incurring of pre-construction expenditures or obligations. This
would, perhaps, have been the more realistic test in the first place. It
certainly is more realistic today due to the investment of time and
money that is often necessary before modem developments reach the
construction stage." In any event, the point is simply that even the
majority did so because the minimum lot requirements were designed to exclude
people, but the Chief Justice seemed to hold that the ordinance unreasonably
intcrfered with the rights of property owners.
95. This proved to be a persuasive factor in Sautto v. Edenboro Apts., 84 N.J.
Super. 461, 202 A.2d 466 (Super. Ct. 1964). "In order to conclude such an
enterprise successfully [construction of a high-rise apartment building], the facts
of business life bespeak the need not only for essential disbursements and financial
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set quantum test has not proved to be an especially effective guarantee
of certainty.
Those courts which choose to utilize the balancing test opt for
fairness. Because they weigh each case on its merits, they achieve
fairer results. However, their decisions are a morass of uncertainty.
Unless a closely analogous case has already been decided, the parties
have to resort to litigation to settle their dispute.
The most promising solution to the problems surrounding the sub-
stantial reliance requirement lies in the adoption of legislation setting
forth the applicable measure of reliance. The considerations involved
in establishing the rights of property owners vis-k-vis the interests of
the public are essentially policy questions more appropriately re-
solved by the legislatures than the courts. The benefit of legislation
would lie in the fact that it would promote greater consistency in
court decisions. To summarize, all three tests have advantages and
disadvantages; it is important to'establish one test and apply it con-
sistently. It also would be desirable for state legislation to establish
the length of time before which and on which permits are valid and
can be relied since these issues arose in a number of cases.90
A second solution, less effective than legislation, would be for local
governments to adopt provisions in their zoning ordinances spelling
out the rights of property owners upon applying for and receiving
building permits. One widely circulated model ordinance includes a
provision for determining whether a conforming use was established
prior to amendment of the ordinance. 97 An apparently increasing
number of ordinances contain it. The inclusion of such provisions
should help to establish the ground rules on which permits are granted
as well as avoid unnecessary litigation. In addition, an abbreviated
commitments, but also a substantial investment in planning, negotiations, and
time-consuming efforts." Id. at 473, 202 A.2d at 472.
96. Some courts have held that a permit is not lawfully granted until all ad-
ministrative action regarding it has been completed and the period for challenging
its issuance has expired. If the ordinance is amended before then, the new ordi-
nance controls. See Russian Hills Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals,
66 Cal. 2d 34, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 423 P.2d 824 (1967). But see United States
Home and Dev. Corp. v. LaMura, 89 N.J. Super. 254, 214 A.2d 538 (Super. Ct.
1965) in which it was held that increased minimum lot-size and frontage require-
ments could not be applied to prevent the development of a previously approved
subdivision until a reasonable time had passed. The 10-month period between
final approval and application for building permits was not long enough to justify
applying the new requirements.
97. F. BAnt & E. BARTLEY, THE TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE 25(American Society of Planning Officials 3d ed. 1966).
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warning might be printed on all building permits to the effect that
they are subject to revocation, and on all permit applications that
they confer no right to proceed unless approved. In several cases in
which such warnings were stamped on the permits or the applications,
the courts weighed the warnings heavily against the property owners
on the theory that they had constructive knowledge of the fact that
they had no right to rely on the permit or the application."
B. Protecting the Rights of Property Owners and the Public Interest
The second major problem concerning zoning estoppel is whether
the rights of property owners and the interests of the public are ade-
quately protected by the principle as it has evolved. An evaluation
of this problem is complicated by a factor not found in most zoning
cases: the question of a local government's accountability to property
owners for misjudgments, mistakes, and omissions while exercising its
zoning powers. This factor is thus presented along with the normal
questions of private versus public interests. As a result, an evaluation
of the cases often becomes heavily subjective because so much hinges
on the standards to which local governments should be held under
such circumstances. Evaluation also is complicated by the fact that
once again it is necessary to approach the cases through the factual
categories, since the considerations which must be weighed vary
greatly.
1. Category One
In category one, zoning estoppel adequately protects the rights of
property owners and the interest of the public. Generally, the owner
will have completed the preliminary preparations for development
and will be in the midst of initiating construction when the govern-
ment orders him to halt-often the first official notification of the re-
zoning or the possibility of rezoning. These facts coupled with the
reliance upon a valid permit make it unfair to force the owner to
abandon his project unless the public's interests are seriously threat-
ened. In most cases, they will not be. Because the use or structure
98. In Russian Hills Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal.
2d 34, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 423 P.2d 824 (1967), the court appeared to rely
heavily upon the fact that the permit stated that it gave no right to rely until
the time for an appeal had lapsed. Most of the other cases in which the permit
or application carried a warning are category three cases. Here, the courts have
held that the warning gave the owNner knowledge that the permit did not authorize
a violation of the zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Weiner v. City of Los Angeles, 68
Cal. 2d 697, 68 Cal. Rptr. 733, 441 P.2d 293 (1968); Mazo v. City of Detroit,
9 Mich. App. 354, 156 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1968).
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was allowed under the ordinance a short time before, it would now be
detrimental to the community only under exceptional circumstances.
Furthermore, the government's change of mind in most of these cases
results from citizen opposition which arose after the permit was issued.
Such pressures are likely to be a poor basis for rational decision-mak-
ing and are perhaps not the most desirable avenue for citizen partici-
pation in the planning and zoning processes. In short, the balance in
category one is generally struck in favor of the property owner, and
the courts accept this analysis by granting relief unless the owner
sought to secure an advantage.
2. Category Two
In category two, the balance is much closer and may swing either
way depending upon the facts presented. Although the owner's in-
vestment of time and money may be as great as in category one, his
case is considerably weakened because, de jure and de facto, he was
generally less justified in relying on the government's conduct. Al-
though he may have relied on circumstances which indeed indicated a
strong probability that his application would be approved, he did
not in fact possess a permit which was the first requisite for gaining
any legal rights. Furthermore, many owners would have realized how
vulnerable they were without a permit and would have waited until
one was issued, thus avoiding the problem of the owner in question.
It was not generally unreasonable for the owner to have relied on the
circumstances, but neither was it necessarily reasonable. The owner's
appeal for relief, in the final analysis, depends very much on the
particular facts of the case.
The same holds true for the government's position. Generally the
owner's intended use or structure will not be detrimental to the public
interest and the government's change of mind will be the result of
citizen opposition. Unless the owner lacked good faith, the govern-
ment can only argue that he could not reasonably have expected to
acquire any rights until he secured a permit. In some cases the govern-
ment's position will be even weaker, as where it lost the initial round
of litigation before the board of appeals or a court and then rezoned
the owner's property in retaliation. Still, there may be instances in
which the public interest should clearly prevail. For example, if the
rezoning had been carefully studied and was not directed at the
owner, and he had relied only on the fact that others had always re-
ceived the same permit, it would seem to be his own fault that he
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invested his money before securing a permit. With all other facts the
same, the government should probably also prevail if the owner relied
solely on the fact that his intended use or structure was permitted as
of right under the ordinance.
3. Category Three
In evaluating the cases falling under category three, it seems best
to begin by distinguishing between those in which the owner was
granted a permit that violated the zoning ordinance and those in
which the permit was valid but contrary to the intentions of the gov-
ernment. There is no reason why the owner's investment and ob-
ligations would be any greater or any less in either event, but the
extent to which the public interest will be affected will probably vary
greatly. If the permit violates the zoning ordinance, the public interest
is likely to be seriously threatened. If the permit simply exceeds the
intentions of the government, the use may or may not be detrimental,
since it is allowed under the ordinance but is only subject to the gov-
ernment's discretion. These are, of course, general propositions which
may not hold true in individual cases.
The balance should be struck in favor of the owner if the permit is
for a valid use or structure, but for the government if for a prohibited
one. Another possible consideration to be weighed is the basis for the
government's mistaken issuance of the permit. Should it be made
accountable for gross mistakes and derelictions of duty which result
in the issuance of a permit but not for misjudgments? If the zoning
administrator is so inept that he cannot find the latest copy of the
zoning ordinance or fails to note a provision that is dearly pertinent,
should the owner suffer? Is a different case presented if the zoning
administrator simply makes an error in computing the number of
units or the floor area that will be allowed? In none of the cases
examined did the court openly consider the basis for the government's
erroneous issuance of the permit, but in a close case this might be
enough to determine the outcome, whether the court admits it or not.
Another factor which the courts probably consider is the length of
time between the issuance of the permit and the government's dis-
covery of its error. An appreciable delay is probably treated as com-
pounding the government's original mistake or misjudgment.
Under this analysis of the cases in category three, those courts which
automatically deny relief on the fictitious ground that everyone is
presumed to know the law often acquiesce in the imposition of a hard-
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ship that is the fault of the government, not the property owner. It
is unfair to summarily dispose of these cases since the public interest
may or may not prove seriously threatened upon examination of the
facts. It would be far more equitable to resolve these cases on their
merits than on the basis of a principle of immunity which automat-
ically renders the government unaccountable for its mistakes and
misjudgments.
4. Category Four
In category four, where the owner relied on the nonenforcement of
a violation, protection of the public interest seems paramount at first
glance, since the relief which the owner is requesting is an exemption
from the requirements of the zoning ordinance. Upon closer examina-
tion, however, it becomes evident that some owners may be able to
make a convincing case. Suppose that when the present owner bought
the property the violation was present, having been committed by
some prior owner. The present owner is thus in no way responsible
for the violation, although perhaps he should have investigated more
thoroughly before purchasing the property.99 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment in a sense contributed to his reliance by failing to detect
the violation and order it corrected. The owner's position becomes
even stronger if the violation has gone undetected for many years.
Such a violation likely is not so great a threat to justify the added
expense to the owner. A further consideration would seem to be the
government's motivation for now wanting to remedy the violation.
If the violation was detected by chance and similar violations exist
throughout the neighborhood, then the owner is in a sense being
singled out for prosecution and little advancement of the public
interest is likely to be gained 10 If, however, the violation was dis-
covered as the result of a program to bring all properties in the neigh-
borhood up to standards, then prosecution is probably justified unless
the owner would suffer an extreme hardship.
99. Anyone who has spent much time trying to discover the zoning classifica-
tion of a particular property would probably agree that it is no easy task, especially
in areas of the central cities which have been rezoned numerous times over the
years. This is evidenced by the reluctance of title insurance companies to insure
the zoning classification of property. Thus, so long as the owner made a reason-
able effort to ascertain the zoning in the category four cases, it is highly fictitious
to say that he should have discovered the violation before purchasing the property.
100. Generally, the courts have held that it is no defense that violations have
not been enforced against others, although there is some authority for the proposi-
tion that the singling out of a particular violator may be contrary to the notion of
equal protection. Annot., 119 A.L.R. 1509 (1939).
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The few courts which have granted relief in the category four cases
seem to accept this analysis. The vast majority of the courts which
automatically rule that no right to violate an ordinance can be ac-
quired by continued violations ignore the fact that the public interest
may or may not be advanced appreciably by enforcement of the
violation. As in category three, it would be far better to try these
cases on their merits and dispose of them as fairly as possible.
In the final analysis, the courts generally dispose of the cases in
categories one and two in a manner that adequately protects the
interests of property owners and the public. However, their mech-
anistic refusal to grant relief in categories three and four is a problem.
Although the number of cases falling in the latter two categories may
be small, the hardship imposed on the owner may be great and
through no fault of his own. The basic question presented in these
cases is that of local government's accountability to landowners for
misjudgments, mistakes, and omissions committed while exercising
zoning powers. Admittedly, this is a difficult question, but not so
difficult as to justify the way the courts have dodged it. Perhaps their
reasoning is that overruling the long line of precedent based upon
various fictions designed to facilitate the enforcement of the law is
ultimately a policy question to be decided by the legislatures. In any
event, the time has come for reform in this area, as it has in many
others involving the question of governmental accountability. The
kind of zoning administration that promoted the cases in categories
three and four does not serve the public interest and is not going to
be eliminated by allowing local governments to continue to cover up
their errors and omissions.
CONCLUSION
The land-use disputes to which zoning estoppel is applicable provide
another illustration of the need for some sort of compensatory land-
use controls mechanism. There is a need for compensatory regula-
tions (heretofore unconstitutional) paying damages to the landowner
equal to the difference between the value of his property before and
after the imposition of the regulation. 1' 1 Payments could be used to
101. The need for some form of compensatory mechanism has been frequently
advocated. Awarding compensation is one of the powers which the National Com-
mission on Urban Problems has recommended be delegated to local governments.
Similarly, the yet undrafted Article 4 of the American Law Institute's Model Land
Development Code is expected to enable local governments to justify otherwise
unconstitutional police power regulations through the payment of compensation.
ALl, MODEL LAND Dxv. CODE xxxiv (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968).
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compensate landowners who would suffer a hardship were the local
government allowed to change its position but to whom it would be
undesirable to grant an estoppel because the public interest would
be seriously affected. The interests of property owners and the public
could be protected simultaneously by paying damages to the land-
owner for not proceeding. The damages to be paid might appropri-
ately be the cost to the property owner of restoring the status quo
that existed before he relied on the government's conduct. Thus, if
he expended $25,000 toward the construction of a gasoline service
station before the government revoked his building permit through
rezoning, the damages to be paid would be $25,000, the cost of de-
molishing the uncompleted station, and any other expenses or obli-
gations directly attributable to the government's change of position.
Because they are not a cost of restoring the status quo, losses, such as
the loss of revenue from the sale of gasoline, would not be com-
pensable. The cost of restoration of the status quo would generally
be an equitable measure of damages in categories one through three,
but some other measure would normally have to be used in cases
falling under category four. There, what the government generally
desires, is not restoration of the status quo, but bringing the property
into conformity with the applicable zoning regulations. If the owner
is entitled to relief, it would be appropriate to assess the damages as
the cost of removing the violation or acquiring the property, if re-
moving the violation is economically unfeasible. Regardless of the
category of case presented, the government, not the property owner,
should have the prerogative of determining whether damages would
be paid; if the owner is entitled to relief, only the public interest
would suffer were he allowed to continue his violation. Although
resort to compensatory payments would probably be infrequent, it is
an appealing technique for treating the property owner equitably
while protecting the public interest and the government's freedom to
exercise its zoning power. If such a mechanism were available, the
courts would undoubtedly be more willing to grant relief in the cases
discussed in this article.
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